The Singapore Model of Housing and the Welfare State by PHANG, Sock Yong
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
2007
The Singapore Model of Housing and the Welfare
State
Sock Yong PHANG
Singapore Management University, syphang@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Public Economics
Commons, and the Real Estate Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
PHANG, Sock Yong. The Singapore Model of Housing and the Welfare State. (2007). Housing and the New Welfare State: Perspectives
from East Asia and Europe. 15-44. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/596
Chapter 2 
The Singapore Model of Housing  
and the Welfare State 
 
Sock-Yong Phang 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While Singapore is not generally regarded as a welfare state, the provision of 
housing welfare on a large scale has been a defining feature of its welfare system.  
The extensive housing system has played a useful role in raising savings and 
homeownership rates as well as contributing to sustained economic growth in 
general and development of the housing sector in particular.   Few would dispute 
the description of Singapore’s housing policies as `phenomenally successful’ 
(Ramesh, 2003).  Singapore’s economic growth record in the past four decades has 
brought it from third world to first world status (Lee, 2000), with homeownership 
widespread at more than 90 percent for the resident population 
     Singapore is a densely populated high-income city-state with 4.2 million people 
and a land area of only 697 square kilometers. Of the 4.2 million people in 2004, 3.5 
million were residents (citizens and permanent residents) and 0.7 million were 
foreigners. 1  Its Gross Domestic Product in 2004 was S$181 billion or US$109 
billion.2   The World Development Report 2004 estimated Singapore's 2002 GNI 
per capita at US$29,610 (using purchasing power parity GNI and exchange rates), 
ranking it 19th highest in its PPP GNI per capita list.   
     A British colony from 1819, Singapore attained self-government in 1959, joined 
the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and became an independent city-state in 1965.  
The People's Action Party that was elected in 1959 has been returned to power at 
every election since.  During the politically traumatic 1960s, the government 
concentrated on issues of employment creation and housing provision, adopting a 
strategy of export oriented growth through attracting foreign investment.  Today, 
there are more than 5,000 foreign companies located in Singapore and many 
multinational corporations have established regional operating and manufacturing 
bases on the island.   
                                                     
1    In the 1990s, the growth rate for foreigners was 9.3% compared to 1.8% for local 
residents.  Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2000. 
2   Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic Survey of Singapore 2004.  The nominal 
exchange rate in February 2005 approximates S$1.65 to US$1. 
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     Table 2.1 shows the Gross Domestic Product for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 -- 
real GDP more than doubled in each decade.  Singapore’s economic growth record 
and ability to attract foreign investments stem from effective public sector planning 
and management of its economy and society.  A network of competent and reliable 
institutions and government linked companies provides rich public sector capacity.  
The Singapore government plays an extensive and multi-dimensional 
developmental role in the economy. The state owns four-fifths of the land and 
determines the deployment of substantial domestic savings.  The scope of public 
enterprises in Singapore encompasses manufacturing, trading, financial, transport 
and other services.  This reliance on the public sector as the catalyst for change, 
with private initiative to fill the gaps, is most visible in the areas of urban housing 
and infrastructure development.   
     Despite the very visible presence of the state and government-linked companies, 
provision of welfare as is generally understood in Europe has not been a feature of 
the economic system.  For much of its history since independence, Singapore 
enjoyed high economic growth rates accompanied by full employment, with a tight 
labour market necessitating the importation of foreign workers (see Figure 2.1).  In 
the period after independence and prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 1985 
stood out as the only year when the city-state experienced negative GDP growth; 
pre-Asian financial crisis unemployment rates were generally frictional in nature 
and below four percent.  Economic growth rates since 1997 has however been more 
volatile with growing concern over structural unemployment (above five percent for 
2002 to 2004) associated with the restructuring of the economy.   
     Given the long record of full employment (until recently), the absence of 
unemployment safety nets is not surprising.  Government policy has focused instead 
on managing income inequality through spreading the benefits of growth through 
ad-hoc measures that would not reduce incentives to work and save.  The 
government’s budget has been described as bias towards large and persistent 
structural surpluses (Asher, 2004).  Special transfers announced in the Minister for 
Finance’s annual budget speech since 1994 have included utility and rental rebates, 
top-ups to Central Provident Fund accounts, New Singapore Shares, Economic 
Restructuring Shares, as well as grants, scholarships and bursaries made through an 
Edusave Scheme to the accounts of each student.  Needy Singaporeans including 
those who are unemployed, are helped through a slew of financial assistance 
schemes offered by a range of government and non-government organizations, 
aimed at providing short-term relief and retraining without creating a dependency 
culture (Yap, 2002).   
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Table 2.1   Key indicators of Singapore’s housing sector 
 
 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 
Total Population (millions) 
  Resident population (millions) 
  Non-resident population (000s) 
  Resident homeownership rate 
  Resident population in HDB dwellings 
 
2.075 
2.014 
61 
29% 
36% 
2.414 
2.282 
132 
59% 
73% 
3.047 
2.736 
311 
88% 
87% 
4.017 
3.263 
755 
92% 
86% 
Macroeconomic data 
   GDP (S$m, 1995 market prices) 
   GNP per capita (S$ current) 
   Unemployment rate 
   Exchange rate (S$/ US$) 
   Gross National Saving/GNP 
   Gross Capital Formation/GNP 
   Residential Construction/GNP  
Housing Loans 
   Total  Housing Loans (S$m) 
   Housing Loans/GDP 
   HDB Mortgage Loans/Housing Loans 
   Banks’ housing loans*/Housing Loans 
 
 
$16,207 
$2,825 
6% 
S$3.09 
    19.3% 
32.2% 
6.2% 
 
$215 
4% 
58% 
42% 
 
$37,959 
$9,941 
3.5% 
S$2.14 
    34.2% 
42.2% 
5.9% 
 
$2,421 
10% 
60% 
40% 
 
$77,299 
$22,645 
1.4% 
S$1.81 
    43.9% 
31.6% 
5.2% 
 
$19,151 
29% 
54% 
46% 
 
$162,162 
$42,212 
3.5% 
S$1.73 
51.5% 
27.6% 
6.18% 
 
$101,384 
64% 
59% 
41% 
Central Provident Fund 
   Balance Due Members (S$m current) 
   Employee Contribution Rate 
   Employer Contribution Rate 
   
 
$777 
8.0% 
8.0% 
 
$9,551 
18.0% 
20.5% 
 
$40,646 
23.0% 
16.5% 
 
$90,298 
20.0% 
12.0% 
Prices 
   CPI (Nov 97–Oct 98=100) 
   Private House Price Index (1998=100) 
   HDB Resale Price Index (1998=100) 
   Price of new 4-room HDB flat in new 
        town location (≈ 100 sq m in S$) 
Housing Price Affordability (4-rm    
        HDB flat price to GNP per capita) 
 
 
36.5 
- 
- 
 
$12,500 
 
4.42 
 
68.2 
27.3 
- 
 
$24,200 
 
2.43 
 
85.2 
57.7 
34.1 
 
  $76,100 
       
        3.36 
 
101.1 
130.3 
104.9 
 
$98,000 
 
2.32 
Housing Stock (HS) 
    Public sector built 
    Private sector built 
    4-room and larger HDB flats/HS (%) 
Persons per dwelling unit 
 
305,833 
120,138 
185,695 
1% 
6.7 
467,142 
337,198 
129,944 
13% 
5.1 
690,561 
574,443 
116,118 
40% 
4.4 
1,039,677 
846,649 
193,028 
51% 
4.2 
Note:  * includes Finance Houses & Credit POSB 
Sources:  Various Singapore government publications and websites. 
 17 
The Singapore Model of Housing and the Welfare State
17
      The government relies almost exclusively on the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
scheme, a mandatory savings scheme to finance a range of different welfare 
services: housing, healthcare, insurance, tertiary education and retirement (Asher, 
2004).   On the supply side, the government is also directly involved in the 
provision of subsidized  education  and  healthcare; the  Housing  and  Development 
Board (HDB) has been the largest housing developer for the past three decades.  
That more than 85 percent of the resident population lives in HDB housing has been 
described by Pugh (1985) as a `symbol of pride, of nationhood, of the political 
achievement of the People’s Action Party, and of government benevolence towards 
the public interest’.   
     Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s 2005 budget speech provides a precise 
description of the government’s approach toward welfare: 
 
We must not breed a culture of entitlement, encouraging Singaporeans to seek 
Government support as a matter of right, whether or not they need it. .. . The better-off 
must help the poor and the disadvantaged – the sick, the elderly, the disabled and the 
unemployed.  In many developed countries, the state takes on this responsibility, but his 
is invariably financed by high taxes and levies on businesses and those who are working.  
Our social compact is rather different.  It is based on personal responsibility, with the 
family and community playing key roles in supporting peopled through difficulties.  The 
state will provide a safety net, but it should be a last resort, not a first resort, and should 
focus on the minority who need help the most.  We thus avoid state welfare, which will 
erode our incentive to achieve and sap our will to strive.  Our social compact enables us 
to keep taxes low, and lets people keep the fruits of their labour and businesses the 
rewards of their enterprise.  And when we do well and have budget surpluses, we can 
distribute some of them back to Singaporean (The Straits Times, 19 February 2005).  
 
     The 2005 budget reduced the top marginal personal income tax rate from 22 to 
20 percent, introduced incentives to develop Singapore further as a financial, 
logistics and tourism centre, and provided resources for worker re-training and skills 
upgrading through a S$500 million transfer to the Lifelong Learning Fund.  
Targeted special transfers to individuals included utility rebates that varied from 
S$60 (5-room HDB flats) to S$200 (1- and 2-room HDB flats); Medisave account 
top-ups ranging from S$50 (ages 21-39) to S$350 (60 years and above); and CPF 
top-ups of S$100 for those aged 50 and above.  Special transfers to funds that 
provide the social safety nets for the poor included S$100 million for the Medifund 
and S$250 million for the recently announced Com-Care Fund to support needy 
Singaporeans, including children from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
     The next section describes the phases of housing policy in the post-war period.  
This is followed by a brief description of housing tenure forms in Singapore.  We 
then evaluate the socio-economic benefits from such comprehensive attention to 
housing sector development.  Inevitably, the long term bias of directing credit and 
resources to the housing sector has resulted in other economic problems which are 
also analyzed.  We conclude with a discussion of policy lessons from Singapore 
approach to the welfare state, and evaluate the transferability of the Singapore 
experience. 
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Figure 2.1    Real GDP growth and unemployment rate, 1973-2004 
Phases of housing policy in the post-war period 
 
Housing policy in Singapore has gone through a number of distinct phases as 
summarized in Table 2.2.  
 
Phase I: Building shortages 
 
The immediate postwar period in Singapore was characterized by chronic housing 
shortages.  In 1947, the British colonial government implemented rent control to 
protect tenants – premises built on or after 7 September 1947 had rents pegged to 
rates which existed on 1 August 1939.  The Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), the 
then town planning authority, stepped up public housing construction, building an 
estimated 20,907 units between 1947 and 1959.  At the time of self-government in 
1959, deplorable housing conditions and housing shortages exacerbated by rapid 
post-war population growth prevailed.  The then newly elected People’s Action 
Party government made housing a priority area of policy concern.  Housing 
institutions and policies were developed systematically and comprehensively to 
advance social development and economic growth.  There exists a vast literature on 
various aspects of the housing sector in Singapore (see for example books by 
Castells et al. (1990) for comparison with  Hong  Kong;  Chua (1997); Low and Aw 
(1997); Phang (1992); Wong and Yeh (1985); and the sample of articles referenced 
here).  Here we provide a brief overview of the institutions and policies that have 
shaped the housing sector: the Housing and Development Board and the Central 
Provident Fund. 
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Table 2.2   Phases of housing policy in the post-war period 
 
 
Housing developments  
Year 
What happened? Why? 
 
Phase 
1947 Rent control at 1939 rents To protect tenants at a time of severe 
housing shortages 
1955 Central Provident Fund 
(CPF)  
To provide social security for the 
working population 
1959 Self governing colony 
1960 Housing & Development 
Board (HDB) 
To provide housing for all those who 
needed them 
1963 Merger with Malaysia 
1964 HDB’s Home Ownership 
Scheme (HOS) 
To enable the lower income group to 
own their own homes 
1965 Independence: Separation from Malaysia 
1966 Land Acquisition Act  To facilitate land acquisition by the 
state 
1968 CPF Approved Housing 
Scheme 
To allow CPF savings to be used to 
support the HDB’s HOS 
1971 Resale market for HOS To allow owners of HOS flats to exit 
the sector 
 
 
 
 
 
I.  
Developing 
housing 
policies and 
institutions to 
cope with 
building 
shortages 
1979 Easing of restrictions on 
resale of HOS flats 
To facilitate upgrading to a second new 
HDB flat as well as residential mobility 
within the sector 
1981 CPF Approved 
Residential Properties 
Scheme 
To allow CPF savings to be used for 
private housing mortgage payments 
1985 First economic recession since independence 
1988 Phasing out of rent 
control 
To facilitate private sector participation 
in the conservation of historical areas. 
1989 Citizenship requirement 
and income ceilings for 
resale flats lifted 
To allow permanent residents access to 
resale HOS flats.  To facilitate 
residential mobility 
 
 
 
 
II.  
Deregulation 
as shortages 
eased  
1993 More housing loans for 
HDB resale flats 
To bring HDB housing loans policy for 
resale flats closer to market practices 
1994 CPF housing grants To facilitate demand side housing 
subsidies for resale HOS flats  
1995 Executive Condominiums To provide private housing at 
affordable prices to the upper-middle 
income group 
1996 Anti-speculation 
measures 
To curb speculative activities and rapid 
rise in housing prices 
 
 
III.  
Financial 
liberalization 
and  
housing price 
inflation 
1997 Asian financial crisis 
2002 Caps on CPF withdrawals 
for housing 
To reduce risk of over concentration of 
household assets in housing 
2003 
 
HDB downsizes 
 
In view of fall in demand for new flats 
and 17500 unsold HDB flats in 2002 
 
IV.  Excess 
housing 
stock 
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The Housing and Development Board   The Housing and Development Board 
(HDB) was set up as a statutory board in 1960, replacing the SIT, to provide `decent 
homes equipped with modern amenities for all those who needed them’.  A target of 
110,000 dwelling units was set for 1960 to 1970.  From 1964, the HDB began 
offering housing units for sale at below market prices, on 99-year leasehold basis, 
under its Home Ownership Scheme (HOS).  The HDB was able to price its units 
below market prices mainly because HDB flats are built on state owned land, much 
of which had been compulsorily acquired from private landowners at below market 
prices (Phang, 1996).  This was made possible by the Land Acquisition Act, enacted 
in 1966, which abolished eminent domain provisions. 
     The political and economic motivations for the HOS are perhaps best understood 
in the words of the then Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew:   
My primary preoccupation was to give every citizen a stake in the country and its future.  
I wanted a home-owning society.  I had seen the contrast between the blocks of low-cost 
rental flats, badly misused and poorly maintained, and those of house-proud owners, and 
was convinced that if every family owned its home, the country would be more stable 
(page 116)…I had seen how voters in capital cities always tended to vote against the 
government of the day and was determined that our householders should become 
homeowners, otherwise we would not have political stability.  My other important motive 
was to give all parents whose sons would have to do national service a stake in the 
Singapore their sons had to defend.  If the soldier’s family did not own their home, he 
would soon conclude he would be fighting to protect the properties of the wealthy. I 
believed this sense of ownership was vital for our new society which had no deep roots in 
a common historical experience (Lee, 2000, p. 117). 
     Policies were introduced to achieve the goal of a home-owning society.  Table 
2.1 shows the rapid increase in the HDB housing stock: from 120,138 units in 1970 
to 846,649 units in 2000.  The homeownership rate for the resident population 
increased from 29 percent in 1970 to 92 percent by 2000.  Singapore’s large public 
housing sector is therefore in ownership terms, a largely privatized sector.  
However, ownership tenure of a HDB dwelling differs in many aspects from 
ownership of a private dwelling.  Ownership rights are limited by numerous 
regulations concerning eligibility conditions for purchase, resale, subletting and 
housing loans. 
 
 The Central Provident Fund   While HDB and related construction finance and 
land policy brought about a transformation of the housing supply side, demand for 
homeownership was `created’ by directing savings in the Central Provident Fund 
(CPF) towards housing.  The CPF had been in existence before the HDB, having 
been established as a pension plan in 1955 by the colonial government to provide 
social security for the working population in Singapore.  The scheme required 
contributions by both employers and employees, respectively, of a certain 
percentage of the individual employee’s monthly salary toward the employee’s 
personal and portable account in the fund.  All employers are required to contribute 
monthly to the fund.  The bulk of contributions can only be withdrawn for specific 
 21 
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purposes (of which housing dominates), on retirement at age 55, or on permanent 
incapacitation of the contributor concerned.  The interest rate on CPF Ordinary 
Account savings is based on a weighted average of 1-year fixed deposit and month-
end savings rates of the local banks, subject to a minimum of 2.5 percent.  Savings 
in the Special and Medisave accounts earn additional interest of 1.5 percentage 
points above the normal CPF interest rate. 
     The CPF became an important institution for financing housing purchases from 
September 1968 when legislation was enacted to allow withdrawals from the fund 
to finance the purchase of housing sold by the HDB and subsequently sold by other 
public sector agencies as well.  The contribution rates at the inception of the CPF in 
1955 were five percent of the monthly salary for employees and five percent for 
employers.   From 1968, the rates were adjusted upward and peaked at 25 percent of 
wages for both employers and employees from 1984 to 1986.  Contribution rates are 
currently 20 percent of wages for employees and 13 percent of wages for 
employers, up to a salary ceiling of $5,000. Contribution rates are lower for workers 
above 55 years of age, and proportion of contributions allocated for investments, 
retirement, and healthcare (in the Ordinary, Special and Medisave accounts) also 
varies with age (Asher, 2004).  Rates have varied depending on economic 
conditions and changes to contribution rates have been used as a macroeconomic 
stabilization instrument to limit inflation or to reduce wage cost. 
     The HDB provides mortgage loans and mortgage insurance to purchasers of its 
leasehold flats (both new and used).  The typical loan quantum is 80 percent of the 
price of the new flat and the maximum repayment period is 25 years.  The mortgage 
interest rate charged by the HDB is pegged at 0.1 percentage points above the CPF 
ordinary account savings interest rate, which in term is based on savings rates 
offered by the commercial banks, subject to a minimum of 2.5 percent.  The HDB is 
a recipient of government loans to finance its mortgage lending, interest of which is 
pegged to the prevailing CPF savings rate.  The mortgage lending rate charged by 
the HDB to homeowners is 0.1 percentage point higher than the rate that it borrows 
from the government, thus ensuring the sustainability of the financing arrangement.  
Housing loans for private housing are provided by commercial banks and finance 
houses.  A schematic view of how housing is financed in Singapore is shown in 
Figure 2.2. 
 
Phase II (1979 - early 1990s): Deregulation and creation of resale market as 
shortages eased 
 
The desirability of any asset is determined to a large extent by its liquidity.  Ease of 
trade determines the efficiency of a market. The promotion of ownership of 
subsidized new HDB dwellings therefore had to be accompanied by policies 
concerning the secondary market for that housing.     However, from the perspective 
of public policy, there was early concern that given the then general housing 
shortage, HDB dwellings should not become a vehicle for speculation by allowing 
the price subsidies to be capitalized on a secondary market.  Resale regulations were  
 22 
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therefore extremely onerous in the early days of the housing program.  These 
regulations were eased as the housing stock increased over time and the housing 
market became more mature (Phang, 1992, pages 92-4). 
     Prior to 1971, there was no resale market for owner-occupied HDB dwellings.  
HDB required owners who wished to sell their flats to return them to the HDB at the 
original purchase price plus the depreciated cost of improvements.  In 1971, a resale 
market was created when the HDB allowed owners who had resided in their flats for 
a minimum of three years to sell their flats at market prices to buyers of their choice 
who satisfied the HDB eligibility requirements for homeownership. However, these 
households were debarred from applying for public housing for a year.  The 
debarment period was increased to two and a half years in 1975.  The minimum 
occupancy period before resale was increased to five years in 1973 and has 
remained in place since. 
     The debarment period, a great deterrent for any household considering sale of its 
dwelling, was abolished in 1979 thereby greatly facilitating exchanges within the 
public housing sector.  This was replaced by a five percent levy on the transacted 
price of the dwelling to `reduce windfall profits’.  A system of graded resale levy 
based on flat type was introduced in 1982, and rules regarding circumstances under 
which levies could be waived were fine-tuned in the 1980s (Phang, 1992, page 93).  
The resale levy system ensures that the subsidy on the second new flat purchased by 
the household from the HDB is smaller than that for the first flat.  
     Between 1968 and 1981, CPF savings could only be withdrawn for purposes of 
down payment, stamp duties, mortgage, and interest payments incurred for the 
purchase of public-sector-built housing.3   In 1981, the scheme was extended to 
allow for withdrawals for mortgage payments for the purchase of private housing.   
From 1984, rules governing the use of CPF savings have been gradually liberalized 
to allow for withdrawals for medical and education expenses, insurance, and 
investments in various financial assets (Asher, 2004).   
     Only citizens, non-owners of any other residential property, households with a 
minimum size of two persons with household incomes below the income ceiling set 
by the HDB were eligible to purchase new or resale HDB flats prior to 1989.  In 
1989, residential mobility was enhanced when the income ceiling restriction was 
removed for HDB resale flats; the resale market was opened to permanent residents 
as well as private property owners who had to owner-occupy their HDB flat.  HDB 
flat-owners who could not own any other residential property before, could also 
invest in private sector built dwellings.  From 1991, single citizens above the age of 
35 have been allowed to purchase HDB resale flats for owner-occupancy.   
 
 
                                                     
3   A relatively minor scheme introduced in 1978 allowed withdrawals to be made for the 
purchase of shares in Singapore Bus Services, the then monopoly provider of public bus 
services. 
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Phase III (early 1990s – 1997): Financial liberalization and housing price inflation 
 
The HDB also provides loans to buyers of resale HDB flats.  Loan financing prior to 
1993 was based on 80 percent of 1984 HDB new flat (posted) prices.  As both new 
and resale prices rose (see Figure 2.3), households purchasing resale flats had to pay 
an increasing larger proportion of the price in cash.  In 1993 HDB moved its 
mortgage financing terms closer to market practice by granting loan financing of up 
to 80 percent of current valuation or the declared resale price of the flat, whichever 
is lower.  In 1993, the CPF Board also began to allow withdrawals of CPF savings 
to be used to meet interest payments on mortgage loans for resale HDB and private 
housing purchases.  Before this, CPF members were allowed to withdraw only up to 
100 percent of the value of these properties at the time of purchase.   
     Deregulation of the HDB resale market has been accompanied by an increase in 
the number of transactions.  The transaction volume of resale HDB flats increased 
from fewer than 800 units in 1979, to 13000 units in 1987, 60000 units in 1999, and 
31000 in 2004 (HDB Annual Reports). Resale transactions as a proportion of total 
(new and resale) owner-occupied public housing transactions, were three percent, 
37 percent, 64 percent and 68 percent in 1979, 1987, 1999, and 2004 respectively.  
The increase in the demand for resale flats in the latter half of the 1990s is in part 
due to the introduction of demand side housing grants.   
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Figure 2.3      Singapore’s CPI and nominal house price indices 
 
Notes:  CPI, 1975 - 2004 (Nov 1997 – Oct 98 = 100); Private house price index, 1975 – 
2004 (1998 Q4=100); HDB resale price index, 1990 – 2004 (1998 Q4 = 100). 
Sources: Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic Survey of Singapore; 
Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority, Real Estate Information System; Singapore 
Housing and Development Board website. 
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     In 1994, demand-side subsidies in the form of CPF housing grants for the 
purchase of resale HDB flats were introduced.  This represents a shift from total 
reliance on subsidies tied to new flats to a system of partial reliance on subsidies 
tied to resale flats.  The subsidy is deposited into the CPF account of the eligible 
household when it applies to purchase a resale HDB flat.  Under the scheme, the 
government provides the first time applicant household with a grant of $30000 to 
purchase a HDB resale flat close to either parents' or married child's residence.  In 
1995, the grant was increased to $50000.  The government also introduced a more 
general grant of $40 000 for eligible households that purchase a resale flat which 
does not need to satisfy the criterion of being close to parents/married child's 
residence.    
     The shift towards constrained housing grants for the purchase of housing on the 
secondary market was necessary for the following reasons.  In the first three 
decades of the HDB’s existence, annual supply of new public housing added 
substantially to the housing stock particularly in the early 1980s.  It was a rapid rate 
that was consistent with high income and population growth combined with a 
situation of grave housing shortage. The supply policies of the HDB that were 
suitable under the above circumstances had to be reviewed as population growth 
stabilized and as basic housing needs were generally met.   
     In cities of developed countries, new construction of housing is a small 
percentage of existing stock and comprises mostly high quality housing.  Even as 
the construction of the basic 1 to 3-room HDB flats have been phased out, the 
construction of 4-room HDB flats may eventually meet with the same fate.  The 
housing board’s ongoing modernization of older estates and its selective en-bloc 
redevelopment scheme (under which old apartment blocks are repurchased, 
demolished, and new estates built) will be even more important then.  Owner-
occupier subsidies (which almost all new households and a large proportion of 
existing households have come to expect as a right of citizenship4) will, as a matter 
of economic efficiency if not political efficacy, has to be increasingly in the form 
housing grants for the purchase of existing housing rather than subsidized prices for 
the purchase of a new unit.   
     Financial liberalization as well as the positive macroeconomic factors resulted in 
rapidly rising housing prices in the early 1990s.  Figure 2.3 shows the trends for 
private and resale public housing price indices as well as the Consumer Price 
Index. 5   In response to the growing concern over the affordability of private 
                                                     
4  The HDB has been described as `a ticket to an easier life for the average Singaporean' and 
`a cash cow for the milking of housing subsidies' (The Straits Times, 19 April 1997). 
 
5 The price indices are compiled by the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Housing 
and Development Board and are not quality-controlled.  While it would be more appropriate 
to use hedonic price indices for housing, these are not available.  It is likely that the quality of 
housing transacted (both in the public and private sectors) has been improving over time.   
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housing, the government introduced the Executive Condominium (EC) scheme, a 
hybrid public-private house type in 1995. The EC scheme also facilitated the HDB's 
withdrawal from the upper-middle-income housing market, allowing it to close the 
queue for its Executive Flats. Its similarity with 99-year leasehold private 
condominiums provides the government with another instrument on the supply side 
to impact private housing prices. The government auctions land for the development 
of EC units to housing developers (private as well as government-linked companies) 
who are responsible for design, construction, pricing, arrangements for financing 
and estate management. Applicant households have to satisfy eligibility conditions 
and abide by resale and other regulations governing these units.   
     Despite an increase in HDB supply of new housing, the introduction of the EC 
scheme as well as increase in government land sales for private housing 
development,  housing prices continued to soar (with the private housing price 
index more than tripling between 1990 and 1996).  On 15 May 1996, the 
government introduced a package of anti-speculation measures to curb real estate 
speculation.  These include capital gains taxes on the sale of any property within 
three years of purchase, stamp duty on every sale and sub-sale of property, 
limitation of housing loans to 80 percent of property value, as well as limiting 
foreigners to non S$ denominated housing loans.  The immediate effect of these 
measures was to cool the property market which however entered a slump with the 
onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Phase IV (1998 - present): Excess housing stock  
  
In response to the fall in demand for housing during the Asian crisis, that was 
particularly pronounced in 1998, the government halted land sales and also ended 
its long standing policy of not providing housing subsidies for singles by 
introducing a $15000 CPF housing grant for eligible single persons to purchase 
resale 3-room or smaller flats.  As housing prices declined further, the CPF housing 
grants was reduced in stages over ten months from January to October 1999 -- $500 
per month for the Single Citizen housing grant, and $1,000 per month for the other 
housing grants.  (In FY 2003/2004, 7,260 households purchased a resale flat under 
the CPF housing grant scheme.) 
     Both the private and public housing sectors were faced with a situation of 
declining prices and unsold units.  A study in 2001 estimated unsold housing stock 
of about 19,800 units for the private sector (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 
2001).  With more than 17,500 unsold new flats in early 2002, the HDB suspended 
its Registration for Flat or queuing system, diverting remaining and new applicants 
to its Built-To-Order programme under which flats are built only when there is 
sufficient demand for them.  In July 2003, in a major restructuring exercise, the 
HDB’s 3000 strong Building and Development Division6 was re-organized and the 
                                                     
 
6   At the time of restructuring HDB’s staff strength was 8,000, including 3,000 in the 
Building and Development Division. The new HDB Corp took in about 800 to 1,000 staff. 
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HDB Corporation Private Limited (HDB Corp) set up as a fully-owned subsidiary 
of HDB.   In November 2004, HDB divested its 100 percent shareholding in HDB 
Corp to the government’s investment holding company, Temasek Holdings.  HDB 
Corp has been assigned responsibility for the design and development of all HDB 
projects until June 2006.   The subsidiaries of HDB Corp now include the Surbana 
group of companies which have also ventured into housing development projects 
overseas.   
     The HDB provides loans to purchasers of both new and resale flats, with the CPF 
having first claim on a property if a borrower defaults on his loan, thus protecting 
the CPF savings of the purchaser.  Interest rate is at the CPF savings rate plus 0.1 
percentage point. The recent low interest rate environment has however given rise 
to the anomaly where interest rates for commercial bank housing loans have been 
lower than HDB’s `subsidised’ loans (as there is a 2.5 percent floor on the CPF 
ordinary account savings rate).  From September 2002, commercial banks have 
been given the go-ahead to compete for a slice of the $63 billion HDB loans market 
pie.  However, as is the case for private housing, banks instead of the CPF would be 
given first claim for such housing loans.   
 
Housing tenure forms in Singapore 
 
Given the large number of foreigners living, working or studying in Singapore, 
population and housing statistics in Singapore make a distinction between resident 
and non-resident population (see Table 2.1).  Resident population comprises 
Singapore citizens and permanent residents.  Non-resident population comprised 19 
percent of the total population in 2000.  However, official government statistics, 
including census data on housing and household often refers only to characteristics 
of the resident population.  The housing market however caters to both groups and 
there is often confusion when statistics on the resident population are misinterpreted 
as referring to the total population or housing stock (see Table 2.3).   Housing 
tenure forms in Singapore are also incredibly complex, with public-private hybrids 
defined by ownership or rental as well as HDB or private.    Land ownership is also 
further defined by freehold, state-owned leasehold (and number of years of 
remaining leasehold), fully owned or part owned (strata-title) status.  This section 
serves to clarify some of these issues as well as explain housing tenure forms in 
Singapore.   
     We infer from census data (see Table 2.3) that 40,813 or 4.2 percent of 
households in 2000 were non-resident households.  While 88 percent of 923,325 
resident households reside in HDB flats, 79 percent of the 964,138 occupied 
dwellings were HDB flats, with 21 percent of occupied dwellings being private 
sector housing.  The total housing stock in 2000 was 1,039,677 units, of which 
81percent were HDB housing (see Table 2.1). The housing vacancy rate in 2000 
(occupied dwellings to housing stock) was about 7 percent. Within the private 
                                                                                                                            
Ministry of National Development, Housing and Development Board Press Release, 26 
February 2003. 
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housing sector, 15,367 of the 40,813 foreign households were owner-occupiers in 
2000 (data from URA REALIS) – a homeownership rate of 38 percent. As such, the 
homeownership rate based on occupied dwellings rather than resident households 
would have been 90 percent. With regard to the housing stock, 83 percent were 
owner-occupied, 10 percent were tenanted, and 7 percent were vacant units.  The 
private housing and rental sectors are therefore larger than reference to statistics on 
the resident population alone would suggest.   
 
Table 2.3 Occupied houses and resident households, 2000 
 
 Occupied 
houses by 
type of 
dwelling 
Resident 
household 
distribution 
by type of 
dwelling 
Resident 
Home 
Ownership 
rate by 
dwelling type 
 
Total  964,138 923,325  
Total % 100.0% 100.0% 92.3% 
HDB flats   79.1%   88.0% 93.2% 
     1- & 2-room     4.8%    5.0% 19.2% 
     3-room   22.9%   25.7% 96.4% 
     4-room   29.5%   33.2% 98.3% 
     5-room & Executive   21.4%   23.7% 98.7% 
     Others     0.5%     0.4% 60.4% 
Condominiums & Private Flats    7.9%     6.0% 82.8% 
Private houses   6.3%    5.1% 90.3% 
Others   6.7%    0.9% 83.8% 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2001), Singapore Population. 
Owner-occupied public housing sector 
 
As can be seen from the data, the dominant housing sector is the HDB owner-
occupied sector.  New flats are sold by the HDB at what were considered subsidized 
prices in the past as there were long waiting lists of up to 140,000 households in the 
mid 1990s.  Demand is regulated by eligibility rules such as household income 
(income ceiling of S$3,000 for those purchasing 3-room flats and S$8,000 for those 
purchasing 4-room or larger HDB flats), non-ownership of private properties at the 
time of application and citizenship status.   The owners of a new HDB flat purchase 
a 99-year leasehold title on the flat.  The government retains ownership of the land 
and common areas within the estate.  Subletting of rooms within a flat (but not 
renting out the entire unit) is permissible.  The sector may be considered a publicly-
managed private sector as homeowners usually finance their purchase with a HDB 
mortgage loan, and administration and maintenance of the estate is the 
responsibility of the town council which is chaired by the Member of Parliament for 
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the constituency.  As such, the state remains very involved even after the HDB flats 
are sold, albeit not in a direct controlling way.  
     A mature resale (secondary) market for these flats allow transactions at prices 
determined by market forces (see Figure 2.3 for the HDB resale price index), 
although the HDB continues to regulate eligibility and credit conditions.  Various 
rules such as a minimum occupation period of five years before resale on the market 
are in place to curb speculative activity.   There is significant mobility within the 
housing sector, with 58 percent of households in 2000 having changed residences 
during 1991-2000 (Singapore Census of Population, 2000).   
      Since 1994, CPF Housing Grants (of up to S$50,000 per flat) have been 
introduced for the purchase of resale flats provided the household meets eligibility 
conditions.  In recent years, a combination of factors – economic recession, 
overbuilding, demand side subsidies and administered prices that were not adjusted 
downwards have led to a situation of excess supply of new HDB flats (17,500 in 
early 2002). 
     Prices for new HDB flats are administered prices and are relatively more stable 
than resale prices. Prices for 3- and 4-room flats are pegged to average household 
income levels to ensure that at least 90 percent of all households can afford a 3-
room repurchased flat7 and 70 percent a new 4-room flat (HDB Annual Report 
1996/97, p.17).  The ratio of the average price of a 5-room flat to per capita GNP 
has been below 6.5.  This is comparable to the range of housing price affordability 
ratios for the OECD countries.8   In the first quarter of 2005, the price range for 4-
room flats purchased directly from the HDB was between $85,000 and $297,000, 
while the range for 5-room flats was between $161,000 and $450,000, with prices 
varying with location and design. 
 
 
Rental public housing 
 
The public housing rental sector represents the social housing sector in Singapore, 
especially since rent control in the private housing sector has been phased out.  It is 
completely regulated by the HDB and provides minimum standard housing (1 or 2-
room flats) for families whose household income must not exceed S$1,500 per 
month at the time of application.  Households in the income ceiling range of 
between S$801 to S$1,500 pay monthly rentals pegged at 30 percent of the market 
rent. For households with incomes not exceeding S$800, the monthly rentals are 
around ten percent of the market rate.  A proportion of rental units also cater to 
`transitional' families waiting for their Home Ownership flat as well as to foreign 
workers in Singapore.    
 
                                                     
7    The HDB purchases 3-room flats in the resale market and sells them to eligible 
households at a price discount. 
8   Miles (1994, p.98) presents estimates of the average price of a new house as proportion of 
per capita GDP in 1990: UK (6.6), US (5.4), France (5.3), Germany (10.6), Netherlands (4.8), 
Sweden (4.1), Japan (9.2), Italy (5.7) and Canada (5.9). 
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Private home ownership sector 
 
     The private housing sector caters largely to the upper echelons of Singapore 
society, expatriates, and foreign investors.  Over time, dwindling private land 
supply (freehold and 999 year leaseholds) has increased the importance of 
government land sales (99 year leaseholds) for residential development in 
determining the level of new supply.  On the supply side, planning regulations on 
density, land use and redevelopment of private properties affect the responsiveness 
of private supply to market conditions. Government regulations affect the sector in 
other important ways.  Foreigners are prohibited from owning private landed 
properties and private flats in buildings of less than six storeys without government 
approval.  Foreign demand for housing assets in Singapore is thus effectively 
confined to the private flats and condominiums.   
 
Hybrid regulated private housing 
 
Executive Condominiums are classified as private housing, but purchasers face 
many of the restrictions that apply to HDB homeowners.  As mentioned earlier, the 
government auctions state land on 99 year leasehold basis for the development of 
EC units to housing developers (private as well as government-linked companies) 
who are responsible for design, construction, pricing, arrangements for financing 
and estate management. Applicant households have to satisfy eligibility conditions 
and abide by resale and other regulations governing these units. (household income 
below S$10,000 per month) and have to abide by the resale and other regulations 
governing these units.  The units can be sold only after five years to Singaporeans 
and permanent residents, and can be sold after ten years to foreigners.  Buyers of 
EC cannot buy a HDB flat directly from the government again, although first time 
home-owners are eligible for the CPF housing grant which can be used toward the 
down payment. 
 
Rental private housing 
 
Rent control has been completely phased out and rents in the non-controlled private 
housing sector are market determined, with the sector catering mainly to the 
expatriate population in Singapore.   
 
 
The socio-economic benefits of Singapore’s housing welfare model 
 
Improvements in the urban environment and the standards of housing in Singapore 
over the past three decades provide very tangible and visible evidence of the success 
of the economic development and housing strategy adopted by the Singapore 
government.  This overwhelming success has been well documented in the existing 
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literature (see references in previous section).   Table 2.1 provides an overview of 
the macroeconomic and housing sector indicators for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.  
     As described in the previous section, Singapore’s housing sector is a rather 
unique hybrid of public-private elements that has worked for the city-state. Faced 
with a largely immigrant population, a grave housing shortage as well as 
insufficient private sector resources and capacity to provide an adequate solution, 
the government took upon itself the task of building a home-owning society.  That a 
large public housing program could deliver satisfactory housing for the majority in a 
relatively affluent city testifies to the production efficiency and responsiveness to 
changes of the Singapore government.  This public provision of a private good on a 
large scale was accompanied by numerous regulations on eligibility, resale and 
financing, which in the earlier decades resulted in some consumption inefficiencies 
(Phang, 1992).  The public-private hybrid has however allowed the government to 
regulate, deregulate and re-regulate the sector with changes in socio-economic as 
well as market conditions.  This section highlights the following favorable socio-
economic effects of the housing welfare approach: 
 
Increase in savings rate 
 
At the inception of the CPF home ownership scheme in 1968, the Gross National 
Saving to GNP ratio was less than 20 percent (see Table 2.1) and insufficient to 
fund the country’s investment needs (32 percent of GNP).  The increase in CPF 
mandatory contribution rates to a peak of 25 percent of wages for employees and 25 
percent for employers by the mid 1980s contributed to a significant leap in the 
savings rate to more than 50 percent of GNP by 2000 – certainly the highest savings 
rate in the world and more than sufficient to meet the country’s investment needs.   
 
Increase in quantity and quality of housing stock 
 
The housing welfare approach enabled Singapore to mobilize long term resources 
on the demand side to finance the rapid supply of housing by the public sector with 
minimal involvement of government expenditure.  Krugman (1994) has critically 
described the overall process as `a mobilization of resources that would have done 
Stalin proud’.   Within three decades of its existence, the HDB had solved the 
housing shortage problem and had progressed to providing larger and better quality 
flats for upper-middle income households (comparable in quality to and competing 
with private sector built apartments), redevelopment of older estates, and retrofitting 
existing flats.  By 2004, the HDB had 876,000 flats under its management, 94 
percent of which were owner-occupied, and 68 percent of which were 4-room or 
larger units (see Table 2.1 for comparison with earlier years).  Upgrading within the 
HDB sector has been facilitated by the development of an active secondary market 
and a system that allowed an eligible household to apply for a second (usually 
larger) subsidized flat after a minimum occupation period.   
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Increase in homeownership rate 
 
The development of well functioning mortgage markets though desirable in itself, is 
often viewed as a means to achieving a higher homeownership rate.  
Homeownership is considered a merit good deserving of policy attention by most 
societies and various policies and institutional arrangements exist to provide 
incentives for homeownership by reducing its costs relative to renting.   In addition 
to government provision of affordable subsidized HDB housing and HDB mortgage 
loans, the policy of allowing high mandatory savings to be used for home purchase 
and not rental made homeownership the dominant option for almost all Singaporean 
households.  Not surprising, and given sustained income increases and low 
unemployment rates, the homeownership rate for the resident population increased 
from 29 percent in 1970 to 88 percent by 1990 (see Table 2.1), and was 93 percent 
for 2004.   
 
Development of mortgage market 
 
Housing policy has contributed in a major way to the development of the mortgage 
sector in Singapore.   In 1970, shortly after the implementation of the CPF 
Approved Housing Scheme, outstanding housing loans were a mere S$215 million 
(see Table 2.1).  This constituted only four percent of GNP, a figure within the 
range presently prevailing in Central Europe and Russia (Renaud, 2004).  Even at 
that early stage, HDB loans had already exceeded banks and finance houses loans, 
comprising 58 percent of the total.  With increases in homeownership rates and 
housing prices (see Figure 2.3), housing loans grew rapidly from S$215 million in 
1970 to S$113,081 million by 2003.  The 2003 ratio of outstanding housing loans to 
GDP at 71 percent is certainly the highest in Asia (compare Hong Kong at 39 
percent, Japan 35 percent, Taiwan 26 percent, Malaysia 22 percent, Thailand 16 
percent, Korea 14 percent, Philippines 12 percent and China eight percent).9     
     Despite the increase in the population residing in HDB flats over time and hence 
increases in HDB mortgage loans, commercial banks10 have maintained their share 
of the housing loans market (at more than 40 percent).  Since January 2003, the 
HDB has stopped providing market rate loans to buyers who are not eligible for its 
concessionary rate loans.  This constituted a deliberate policy to increase the market 
share for commercial banks.  Within the year, bank origination of HDB mortgage 
loans and refinancing of existing HDB loans grew to S$3.5 billion by the end of 
2003 (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2003/2004).  This has increased 
commercial banks’ share of housing loans from 41 percent in 2000 to 47 percent in 
2003, with the proportion set to increase further in the future.  
                                                     
9    Figures for other Asian countries are from Renaud (2004) and are for 2001-2002.   
10   Commercial banks here include Credit POSB and finance houses.  See Phang (2001) for 
details of financial institutions involved in housing loans origination in Singapore.  
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Social policy 
 
The large public-built-private-owned housing sector plays an extremely important 
role in the shaping of Singapore society.  The physical plans of HDB new towns 
have been designed to integrate the various income and racial groups within the 
public housing program, and this has prevented the development of low-income or 
ethnic ghettos.  Singapore is a multi-racial society 11  where racial issues are 
considered potentially explosive and therefore carefully managed.  The colonial 
administration had in its early days of town planning, followed a policy of racial 
segregation.  Together with the communist threat, the management of racial 
tensions (there were racial riots on a number of occasions) were major political 
challenges in the 1960s.  Beginning in the 1970s, the HDB allocated new flats in a 
manner that would give a `good distribution of races’ to different new towns.  The 
public housing program provided the government with a potent tool to break up 
ghettos and through such dispersion to contribute to social integration and nation-
building.  However, by 1988, a trend of ethnic regrouping through the resale 
market, was highlighted as a housing problem which would lead to the re-
emergence of ethnic enclaves.  In 1989, the HDB implemented a Ethnic Integration 
Policy under which racial limits were set for HDB neighbourhoods.  When the set 
racial limits for a neighbourhood is reached, those wishing to sell their HDB flats in 
the particular neighbourhood had to sell it to another household of the same ethnic 
group.  The government had emphasised that `our multiracial policies must continue 
if we are to develop a more cohesive, better integrated society.  Singapore’s racial 
harmony, long term stability, and even viability as a nation depend on it’ (Ooi, 
et.al., 1993, p.14). 
     Housing policy have also been tailored to support the family institution, and to 
discourage individuals whether young or old, to live on their own.  Singles, until 
today, remain ineligible to apply directly to the HDB for subsidized housing, 
although they have since 1991, been allowed to purchase resale flats.  Unmarried 
mothers are also similarly disqualified from applying directly to the HDB for 
subsidized housing.  To promote closer family relations, a variety of housing 
priority schemes allowed applicants residing with or close to their parents/children a 
shorter waiting period before being allocated flats.  Households applying for the 
CPF Housing Grant also enjoy an additional premium if the resale flat purchased is 
within the same town/estate or within two km for adjacent town of parents’/married 
child’s residence. 
     In 1987, as part of a bevy of measures to encourage couples to have more 
children, a Third Child Priority Scheme allows families with at least three children 
priority in obtaining larger HDB flats.  The lower income group were however to be 
discouraged from having large families.  Under the Small Families Improvement 
Scheme introduced in 1994, the poor were encouraged to limit their family size to 
no more than two children.  In return, the children enjoy education bursaries, and a 
                                                     
11   The resident population is 76.8 percent Chinese, 13.9 percent Malay, 7.9 percent Indian, 
and 1.4 percent others (Census 2000). 
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housing grant of $16,000 is paid to the CPF account of the wife which can be used 
to buy a 3- or 4-room HDB flat. 
     The HDB is also empowered to fine errant residents, cancel applications, and 
evict families for various offences such as late payment of bills, illegal renting out 
of entire flat, breaking immigration laws by harboring illegal immigrants, or being 
convicted for a ‘killer-litter’ offence.  Motorists who do not pay their parking fines 
are also not given the keys to their flats until they pay their fines. 
 
Impact on economic distribution 
The vast majority of households in Singapore have benefited from access to 
ownership of affordable public housing.  The active resale market allows for 
mobility within and out of the market and for the benefits of price discounts to be 
capitalized after a minimum occupancy period.  Each household is allowed to apply 
twice for a `housing subsidy' (a price discounted flat or a CPF grant) that has been 
described as `a ticket to an easier life for the HDB heartlander' (The Straits Times, 
19 April 1997).   A study on housing wealth by Phang (2001) indicates that the 86 
percent of households residing in HDB flats owned at least 48 percent of the gross 
housing wealth (HDB households are also allowed to own other private residential 
properties provided they satisfy various requirements).  Housing policy and housing 
asset inflation have over time increased both gross and net housing wealth 
significantly.   This has however contributed to a situation where housing price 
appreciation and depreciation (see Figure 2.3), with their attendant wealth and 
distributive consequences, have become politicized issues.   
     Another related measure has been the retrofitting (upgrading) of older public 
housing estates at considerable public expense since 1989.  This multi-billion dollar 
exercise is part of the government's `Asset Enhancement' programme and represents 
yet another round of subsidies for households that benefit from the substantial 
improvements made to their homes and housing estates. House type as a proxy for 
household wealth has also become a means of facilitating redistribution via the 
budget.  The regressivity of the Goods and Services Tax implemented in 1994 was 
offset by annual rebates (announced as part of the fiscal budget and varying with flat 
type) to households residing in public housing in the form of waivers on rents and 
service and conservancy charges (S&CC).  In 2001, S&CC rebates were 
implemented to help lower income Singaporeans cope with the recession.  In the 
2002 budget, rent and S&CC rebates for HDB flats were extended to 2008.  Since 
2000, transfers to individuals in the form of CPF Top Ups, New Singapore Shares 
and Economic Restructuring Shares used house type and/or house value as one of 
the factors in determining allotment.    
 
Contributions to macroeconomic growth and stabilization  
 
Sandilands (1992) describes the construction sector as a leading sector as its growth 
rates were above the rate of growth of overall GDP, and also because its 
fluctuations were a leading indicator of fluctuations (down as well as up) in GDP.  
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Between 1965 and 1998, the real growth rate of the construction sector averaged 9.4 
percent per annum while average real GDP growth was 8.8 percent.  Despite the 
various inefficiencies associated with the regulated nature of the housing sector, the 
priority accorded to housing has not had an adverse effect on overall economic 
growth.   
     The impact of housing policy on macroeconomic stability in the short term is 
less clear.  For the earlier period when a serious housing shortage existed, Wong 
and Wong (1975) estimated an impact multiplier for HDB construction activity at 
1.277 for 1960 to 1969.  Low and Aw (1995, p.42) mention the use of public 
housing activities as a macroeconomic stabilizer to create income and employment 
whenever a recession loomed during the 1960s and early 1970s.  However with 
increases in income and a tight labour market since the mid 1970s, the construction 
industry has become highly dependent on non-resident workers and has long ceased 
to be regarded as a venue through which domestic employment can be generated.  
     Krause et.al. (1987) have suggested that public sector construction (especially by 
the HDB) has been used as a pump-priming device in times of economic slowdown 
in 1975-76 and 1982-83.  The acceleration in public housing construction in 1982-
83 was considered by Krause to have been excessive in that it contributed towards 
‘over-heating’ of the economy and the property slump and recession which 
followed in 1985-87 (Krause, p.161). 189,000 HDB flats were constructed during 
the Fifth Five-Year Building Programme when the original target set in 1980 was 
for the construction of 85,000 to 100,000 flats.  It was hypothesized by Krause et.al. 
that the acceleration in public housing construction served other than a growth 
objective - 1984 being an election year as well as a year for celebrating 25 years of 
achievement as an independent nation.  As acknowledged by then Prime Minister 
Lee, `We made one of our more grievous mistakes in 1982-84 by more than 
doubling the number of flats we had previously built (Lee, 2000, page 120).’  The 
subsequent deceleration in public sector construction, although necessary, was also 
ill-timed from a macroeconomic stabilization perspective as it coincided with a 
decline in private sector construction as well as a slow down in general economic 
activity.   
     Besides HDB construction activity, government policy impacts on housing asset 
prices in other important ways.  A study by Phang and Wong (1997) shows that 
policies on the availability of HDB and CPF finance for housing had the most 
significant impacts on housing prices.  These policies include extending the use of 
CPF savings for private housing in 1981, liberalizing the terms of HDB mortgage 
loans for resale flats in 1993, and the introduction of CPF grants for purchasing 
HDB resale flats in 1994.  Such `shocks' on the demand side needed to be offset by 
government policies to generate the requisite supply, although these have not 
always been well synchronized.  Citing then Senior Minister Lee: 
 
I should have known that it does not pay to yield to popular pressure beyond our capacity 
to deliver.  Yet I was party to a similar mistake in the early 1990s.  As property prices 
rose, everybody wanted to make a profit on the sale of their old flat and then upgrade to a 
new one, the biggest they could afford.  Instead of choking off demand by charging a 
levy to reduce their windfall profits, I agreed that we accommodate the voters by 
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increasing the number of flats built.  That aggravated the real estate bubble and made it 
more painful when the currency crisis struck in 1997.  Had we choked off the demand 
earlier, in 1995, we would have been immensely better off (Lee, 2000, p. 121). 
 
     The asset bubble that developed in the early half of the 1990s was choked off 
when anti-speculation measures, in the form of capital gains taxation, were 
implemented in May 1996 (ahead of the 1997 Asian economic crisis).  The HDB 
also tightened various regulations: in April 1997, HDB flat buyers were limited to 
two subsidized loans, where there had been no limit before.  In May 1997, the HDB 
implemented various measures to curb housing demand of upgraders (households 
applying for a second new subsidized flat from the HDB).  These measures include 
lengthening the time period before flat lessees are eligible to purchase a second new 
flat from the HDB from five to ten years, and revising the graded resale levy 
system. 
     The increasing integration of the private and public housing markets as 
evidenced by their increased substitutability and correlation in price trends (see 
Figure 2.3) provided policymakers with more housing market instruments to affect 
the housing market in other defined ways.  First, the Executive Condominium 
scheme represents a private-public hybrid development that has allowed HDB to 
`privatize' the construction and financing of its Executive flats.  These flats are close 
substitutes for 99 year leasehold private condominiums that are open to foreign 
investors and therefore have seen the highest price volatility in the past.  The supply 
of ECs thus provides the government with a direct instrument to affect prices in the 
sector and to ensure that housing for the upper middle group remains affordable.   
     Secondly, the government has also developed the capacity of government- linked 
companies (such as Capital Land and Keppel Land) to compete in the housing 
developers market, thus reducing the oligopolistic power of a few large private 
developers in the small private housing market.   
     Thirdly, HDB pricing policy together with the CPF housing grant, introduced in 
1994, has served a useful function of supporting prices in the HDB resale market 
amidst the recent economic downturn. Prices for HDB new flats have declined only 
marginally and these prices effectively set the floor for the housing market.  With 
the recent decline in HDB resale flat prices, an increasing number of applicants on 
the queue for new flats opted out of waiting for their flat to purchasing one on the 
resale market with the CPF grant.  The rate of application for the CPF Housing 
Grant increased from 500 per month in 1997 to 2,200 per month by the end of 1998.  
In 1999, the HDB adjusted the S$40,000 grant downwards by S$10,000.  The 
variability of the grant with market conditions provides the government with yet 
another policy to affect housing demand. 
     Finally, the extreme openness of the Singapore economy has meant that 
economic growth has been largely foreign investment and export driven, both of 
which are affected significantly by external factors.  Pump-priming in the traditional 
Keynesian sense of increased government expenditure has limited effectiveness due 
to high leakages  -   an estimated 54 cents of every dollar spent leaks abroad through  
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imports (Lee, H.L. 1999) so that the multiplier effect of government spending is 
small. In both the 1985 and 1998 recessions, the Singapore government utilized a 
cut in the employer's mandatory CPF contribution rate as a means of reducing wage 
costs and restoring competitiveness (from 25 to ten percent in 1986 and 20 to ten 
percent in 1999).  In the absence of other measures, and given the prevalence of the 
use of the CPF contributions for housing mortgage payments, the CPF cuts would 
have increased the mortgage default rate and possibly affected the stability of 
lending institutions.12  However, adjustments were concurrently made by the CPF to 
allow automatic withdrawal of funds from a member's CPF Special Account (meant 
for old age) to service mortgage payments, should there be a shortfall.  The CPF 
Board also made bridging loans available for those who had depleted savings in 
both their Ordinary and Special Accounts.  
     The HDB as the largest player in the housing loans market made available 
various help schemes for those affected by the recession and/or CPF cut.  These 
included a five-year reduction in monthly mortgage payments (payments to be 
reassessed from the sixth year), payment of mortgage loan arrears by installments 
over six months to a year, deferment of payment, extension of loan repayment 
period, and including more family members as joint owners.  Such measures 
undoubtedly reduced the default rate on mortgage loans, thus contributing to the 
overall stability of the financial sector in the midst of the Asian crisis.   
     The extreme openness of the Singapore economy limits the macroeconomic tools 
available to the government for short run stabilization purposes to the exchange rate 
and measures that directly affect business costs. The structure of the housing market 
has allowed the CPF contribution rate to be more effectively used as a discretionary 
instrument to affect labor cost.  The integral comprehensiveness of economic, 
housing, and housing finance policies thus also serves a useful purpose of providing 
policy makers with the flexibility to steer housing policy to achieve desired (short as 
well as longer term) economic objectives.   
 
Problems associated with Singapore’s housing welfare model 
 
The housing approach adopted in Singapore has undoubtedly increased the savings 
and homeownership rates, mobilize resources for the housing sector and contributed 
to increase in housing loans and the development of the primary mortgage market.  
However, the approach is not without its detractors.  Singapore’s housing strategy is 
                                                     
12   Low and Aw (1997) provides a description of how an increase in the CPF contribution 
rate is used as an anti-inflationary tool in mopping up excess liquidity and spending during 
times of rapid wage growth.  However Low and Aw suggested (before the 1998 recession) 
that the CPF as a macroeconomic stabilization tool has probably reached its limits as `it 
would be too disruptive economically and politically to change the rules with so many people 
committed to large housing mortgages and repayments.  This lock-in effect of many CPF 
schemes must also be noted as they effectively reduce the degree of flexibility the next time 
CPF adjustments are considered in any macroeconomic stabilization exercise' (p. 101). 
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inherently policy driven and centrally controlled, with major decisions on savings 
rate, savings allocation, land use, housing production, and housing prices being 
largely determined by the government.  It is, in other words, a neo-classical 
economist’s nightmare.  Pugh (1985), in the context of providing a set of operating 
guidelines for a good housing system, and advocating Singapore’s strategy as a 
good model, writes: 
 
… do not be too perturbed if some orthodox (neo-classical) economists argue that 
housing is over-allocated by subsidy.  Show them that `subsidy’ is a concept which 
cannot be fitted easily to housing, and produce counter arguments, which are respectable 
in economics, and which are readily available. 
 
     However, two decades and 35 years later, it may no longer be `respectable’ to 
continue to argue for the continuation of a system that has outlived certain aspects 
of its usefulness.  While the CPF-HDB housing scheme had its merits in the past, 
the objectives that the scheme set out to achieve have been surpassed and the policy 
problem has become one of how to reduce its dominance with minimal upsets to 
asset values, household wealth and lenders’ balance sheets.  This section reviews a 
number of problems that have become associated with the large scale directed credit 
to the housing sector, and may serve as guidance for other countries with, or 
contemplating the adoption of similar schemes.   
 
Crowding out 
 
Singapore’s housing strategy has been criticized for over-allocation of resources to 
housing, resulting in crowding out of consumption, as well as human capital and 
corporate investments.  Despite widespread homeownership and rapid increase in 
housing wealth, Phang (2004) found no evidence that house price increases have 
produced wealth or collateral enhancement effects on aggregate consumption.  
Instead, due to the mandatory nature of the CPF as well as households’ inability to 
withdraw housing equity to finance consumption, households in Singapore face 
strong liquidity constraints.  In addition to the welfare loss from consumption 
denied, Bhaskaran (2003) is of the view that the low percentage of disposable 
income spent has hurt the development of the retail sector in Singapore.   
     The CPF has also been blamed for a weak domestic corporate sector (since 
potential entrepreneurs are unable to access their savings for start-ups), and the 
crowding out of domestic private sector investments.  The corporate sector in 
Singapore is dominated by MNCs and government-linked companies -- a recent 
study by Bhaskaran (2003) confirms that indigenous firms earn lower returns than 
foreign-owned firms within Singapore, and lower returns as compared to listed 
companies in Hong Kong, Japan Korea, Taiwan the US.  Krugman (1994) and 
Young (1992, 1995), for example, have questioned the basis and sustainability of 
Singapore’s economic growth in a series of studies as far back as the early 1990s.  
Pointing to the low contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, Krugman 
referred to the Singapore miracle as having been based on ‘perspiration rather than 
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inspiration’ – ‘All of Singapore’s growth can be explained by increases in measured 
inputs.  There is no sign of increased efficiency.’  
 
Housing sector impacts 
 
Given the nature of the real estate industry, the tilt of resources to the housing sector 
is not easily matched by corresponding increases in supply.  Ceteris paribus, one 
can infer that housing and land price levels in Singapore are higher with the CPF 
housing scheme than without.  In the first decade (1968 – 1981) when the CPF 
savings was directed only toward public housing, administered prices, stringent 
eligibility criteria, and long waiting lists were used to allocate the HDB’s supply of 
new flats.  Moreover, in the absence of a secondary market for HDB flats during 
that period, the inflationary impacts on a tightly regulated housing sector were not 
immediately apparent.   
     However, such mechanisms could not be used when savings were similarly 
directed to private housing beginning in 1981.  The 1981 liberalization as well as 
the 1993 liberalization of HDB and CPF regulations for HDB resale flat housing 
loans had significant impacts on housing prices, contributing to the development of 
speculative bubbles that subsequently burst (Phang and Wong, 1997).   
     When the CPF contribution rates were used for macroeconomic stabilization, 
increased to mitigate inflationary pressures from higher wages (1978 – 1984) or cut 
to reduce wage costs and preserve jobs (1985 and 1998), the effect was to 
exacerbate the housing price boom and bust (see Figure 2.3 for housing price index) 
by channeling resources into real estate during an inflationary period and reducing 
resources to the sector during a recession.    
 
Consumption inefficiencies 
 
Singapore’s mandatory savings and housing policies have very substantial impacts 
on household’s consumption and investment patterns.  Savers’ and consumers’ 
rights in decision making are constrained by numerous CPF and HDB restrictions 
and regulations.  Consumption inefficiencies arise when households value the in-
kind transfers/subsidies at less than the costs of providing them, or alternatively, at 
less than an equivalent cost but unrestricted cash grant.  Moreover, numerous 
regulations to prevent profiteering and speculation as well as restrictions in housing 
location choice resulted in inefficient location and commute patterns for households 
(Phang, 1992).   
     Over the years, both the CPF and HDB have found it necessary to become more 
saver/consumer responsive and have liberalized regulations in order to reduce 
distortions and provide more investment as well as housing options.  There is now a 
wider range of investment and merit good related consumption (education and 
health) options for CPF members.  The shift toward demand-side subsidies in the 
form of CPF housing grants to subsidize the purchase of resale HDB housing since  
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1994 has been very well received.  This has improved households’ ability to 
optimize with regard to their housing options.   
 
Retirement financing 
 
     The typical household in Singapore has the bulk of its wealth invested in housing 
(Phang, 2001).  Despite the high savings rate, overinvestment in housing and over 
exposure to the risk of a decline in housing price affecting the retirement (and 
healthcare) financing of an aging population has become issues of policy concern, 
especially since the bursting of the real estate bubble in 1997 (see Figure 2.3).  Lim 
(2001) projects that 60 to 70  percent of the 50-55 years age group will not have 
sufficient funds in their account to meet the government stipulated minimum sum 
needed for retirement of S$80,000 in 2003.13  Analyzing CPF data for 2000, Asher 
(2004) finds the average balance for active CPF contributors was $53,000, 
equivalent to 1.27 times the per capita GNP – inadequate to finance retirement of 
more than 20 years duration on the average.   
     McCarthy et.al. (2002) show through simulations that the average worker in 
Singapore is likely to be `asset-rich and cash-poor’ upon retirement with 75 percent 
of his retirement wealth in housing asset, provided housing values continue to rise 
in real terms.  In contrast, an American elderly household would have only 20 
percent of their retirement wealth in housing asset.  If the housing market were to 
take a downturn and remain depressed for years (as in Japan), this could reduce 
retirement asset accumulation for the Singapore worker substantially.   This raises 
the problematic issue of over concentration of household assets in housing resulting 
in a risky under-diversified portfolio at retirement.   
     A report by the government appointed Economic Review Committee in 2002 
arrived at a similar conclusion that CPF members were `asset rich and cash-poor’ 
and made recommendations to limit CPF withdrawals for housing, and for the 
government to explore ways for homeowners to monetize their property. 14   
However, the committee was also cognizant of the need to implement changes 
gradually, in order not to further destabilize the fragile post Asian-crisis real estate 
sector.  Agreeing with the committee’s recommendations, the government moved to 
cap CPF withdrawals for housing at 150 percent of the value of the property, with 
                                                     
13   At age 55, a CPF member may withdraw his CPF savings, but is required to leave a 
minimum sum in the CPF of S$80,000, of which at least half must be in cash and the other 
S$40,000 may be in property.  The cash amount is released in installments from the age of 62 
years until it is exhausted.  The member may also choose to buy a life annuity with an 
insurance company or deposit it in a bank.   
14   Economic Review Committee: Sub-committee on policies related to taxation, the CPF 
system, wages and land (2002). ‘Refocusing the CPF system for enhanced security in 
retirement and economic flexibility.’   Reverse mortgages in Singapore are available only for 
owners of fully-paid up private properties aged 55 or above.  Between 1997 and 2004, only 
215 homeowners have taken up loans worth S$100 million (channelnewsasia.com).  Asher 
(2004) views the reverse mortgage as suffering from severe technical problems and high 
transactions costs.  
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the cap moving down gradually to 120 percent over five years for new private 
housing loans. 
 
Lack of unemployment insurance  
 
With recent changes in the macroeconomic environment, unemployment rates 
above five percent for 2002-2004, and greater volatility in economic growth, there 
is growing concern over structural unemployment associated with the restructuring 
of the economy.  Various programmes exist to help the unemployed find jobs, 
upgrade their skills or retrain for employment, so that they can become 
economically independent again.  These programmes may be considered short term 
unemployment benefits under a different name.  However, the lack of 
unemployment insurance and limited public social assistance available when 
structural unemployment is expected to be long term has led some to question the 
viability of the current welfare system.  Yap (2002) has proposed that an 
employment insurance scheme be introduced as another component of the CPF.  
Asher (2004) makes a strong case for the introduction of tax financed schemes to 
address the needs of the lifetime poor, and social risk pooling to address longevity 
and inflation risks.  According to him: 
 
This case has become stronger due to the unilateral alteration of the implicit social 
contract by the government. This contract provided for acceptance of government’s 
socio-economic engineering and political control in return for job security and full 
employment.  The government is not able to fulfill the latter element, but still wants to 
continue to undertake socio-engineering and maintain political control.  This is a 
disequilibrium situation which will need to be resolved. 
 
However, Asher acknowledges that the prospects for the required mind-set change 
by policymakers are not encouraging. 
 
Financial Sector development 
 
As required by the CPF Act, the CPF channels members’ deposits to the purchase of 
government bonds.  The government through the Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation invests the bulk of the funds directly abroad, thus bypassing 
Singapore’s financial markets. Bhaskaran (2003) contrasts the `remarkably poorly 
developed’ status of Singapore’s savings industry against its high savings rate.  
`Financial planners, unit trusts, stock brokers, pension funds, pension advisors, 
wealth management associated with middle-class households, financial journals, etc 
are all under-represented in Singapore compared to say Hong Kong.’  It has also 
been observed that the debt market in Singapore has remained relatively 
unsophisticated and illiquid due primarily to the cash rich public sector and the 
dominance of MNCs that typically do not depend on domestic sources of capital 
(Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, 1998).   
     A similar observation can be made with regard to the mortgage sector.  While the 
housing loans to GDP ratio has exceeded 70 percent, more than half of outstanding 
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housing loans are originated by the HDB whUBirminghamich in turn obtains 
mortgage funding loans from the government.  The HDB is not a financial 
institution while the CPF is described as a non-bank financial institution.  The size 
of the mortgage market as such is smaller than one would expect, given the high 
loan to GDP ratio.  The mortgage sector’s linkages with capital markets are weak 
and mortgage instruments relatively unsophisticated – there is no secondary 
mortgage market.   
     In recent years, efforts to improve the mortgage sector’s linkages with capital 
markets have taken a number of forms. (a) Though the government traditionally 
runs a budget surplus each year and has no need to borrow, the issue of bonds by the 
government and statutory boards to create a bond market has been undertaken with 
the objective of establishing a S$ yield curve for the debt market.  In line with the 
objective, the HDB has started issuing bonds from 1999 to fund its building 
programs.  (b)  From 2002, instead of the CPF having first claim on a property if a 
borrower defaults on his housing loans (which protects his retirement savings), 
banks have been given first claim for private housing loans, thus paving the way for 
standardizing mortgages for securitization.  (c)  From 2003, banks have also been 
allowed to make loans to those buying HDB flats with unsubsidized housing loans 
and to offer refinancing for these loans; banks would also enjoy first charge over the 
CPF for these HDB properties (Phang, 2003).  These efforts to enlarge the role of 
commercial banks in the mortgage market will help to improve the integration of 
the mortgage sector with the rest of the financial sector.  
 
Governance issues 
 
Pension fund governance issues relating to the responsibilities of trustees, 
accountability, and transparency are important areas of concerns for all 
stakeholders.  In the US for example, the principles and procedures required of 
pension fund fiduciaries are legislated under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act.  In the Singapore context, the CPF balances due to members at S$110 
billion (in September 2004) are considerable.  Their ultimate investment by the 
Government Investment Corporation of Singapore has however been described by 
Asher (2002) as `by law non-transparent and non-accountable, leading to a highly 
regressive large tax on provident fund wealth and to low replacement rates’.   These 
concerns as well as that of ensuring the core administrative tasks are performed 
satisfactorily are major challenges for any mandatory pension scheme.   
 
 
Transferability of Singapore’s housing welfare experience 
 
 
The success of the Singapore’s housing welfare model demonstrates what can be 
achieved with strategic planning to mobilize resources and guide key investments.  
Complemented by close attention to the supply part of the equation as well as 
policies which created markets over time and accommodated private initiatives to 
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fill the gaps, the process has helped Singapore to avoid the worst outcomes of the 
extremes of central planning and unplanned growth.  Numerous city governments in 
former socialist countries and in Asia are also major landowners, yet the absence of 
markets often makes these cities inefficient.  Those cities can learn much from 
Singapore’s planning process and its active role in creating markets. 
     However, while similar approaches have been adopted by governments 
elsewhere, it is in this day and age, difficult to find strong advocates for 
government-centered housing welfare systems.  The transferability of Singapore’s 
experience need to be juxtaposed with the local political and social context, in 
particular, the city-state’s ability to control the entry of migrants who can impose a 
strain on the housing service sector.   Moreover, the tactics on which Singapore 
relies – compulsory savings, state land ownership, and state provision of housing, 
complemented with an extensive public sector – could easily have spawned 
widespread inefficiency and corruption.   
     Singapore’s effective implementation of such planning and regulation is 
attributable to a network of competent and reliable organizations that together 
provide rich public sector capacity.  The quality of public administration in 
Singapore is a result of recruitment based on merit, competitive pay benchmarked 
against private-sector salaries, extensive computerization and a civil service culture 
of zero tolerance for corruption (Phang, 2000).  Where governments and public 
sector leadership are weak and/or corrupt, such extensive intervention and 
government control over resource allocation can be potentially abused and may 
carry a higher cost than inaction.    The need for strong legislation and a proper fund 
governance structure to ensure that the interests of provident fund members are 
adequately protected cannot be overemphasized.   
     The housing welfare strategy is itself a legacy of the post-World War II years, 
when `only governments could marshal the resources necessary to rebuild 
devastated and dislocated nations’ (Yergin and Stanislaw, 2002).  In the last two 
decades, the focus of attention has shifted from market failure to government failure 
– with privatization and deregulation as the preferred strategy generally, as well as 
in the development the housing sector.   The present concerns faced by 
Singaporeans, in particular the lack of unemployment safety nets and  the possible 
inadequacy of personal resources for retirement and healthcare in the future, serve 
to highlight the risks of overemphasizing housing in the welfare system for too long.  
Policymakers now have to grapple with tradeoffs and difficult decisions in trying to 
reduce the dominance of housing welfare without adversely effecting housing asset 
markets.   
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